Abstract Consumer empowerment and protection are frequently discussed in contemporary energy policy debates. The process of consumer empowerment through information and consumer education has great potential, yet consumer switching as the concomitant outcome of this process remains low. Additional protection for vulnerable consumers is called for. This article is centred on the path to achieving consumer empowerment and protection. In particular, it stresses that empowerment should be viewed as a long-term process. Regulators should not focus on the mere outcome of switching and adopt remedies aimed at changing consumer behaviour in the short-term.
Introduction
Consumer empowerment forms a leading slogan in contemporary EU policy discourses (Commission 2007; Commission 2011a; Commission 2011b ; Commission 2012a), including energy market liberalization (Commission 2015a; Commission 2015b) . This is reflected in the construction of a "New Deal" for consumers, as part of the promotion of an integrated energy market (Commission 2015b) , and is explicit in the proposed lengthy and detailed regulatory framework for a "consumer centred clean energy transition" comprising, in essence, the Fourth Energy Package (Winter Package).
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To this end, the European Commission (Commission) has proposed a wide range of different measures empowering consumers to act (Commission 2015b). These measures centre around the provision of information and include mechanisms for more accurate metering and billing and improved access to energy consumption data. The roll out of smart meters is seen as instrumental in that regard. Smart meters measure energy consumption accurately and provide more information than conventional meters. They can transmit and receive data for information and monitoring purposes using electronic communication (Commission 2016f, Article 2(18) ). In addition, the Commission wants to educate consumers on the possibility of switching and make switching easier by reducing the burden and time involved and improving comparison tools (Commission 2015b, pp. 3-5) . Empowering consumers, which encompasses attempts to enlist them as active market participants through the provision of information (process) and the concomitant triggering of consumer switching (outcome), can be seen as a partial solution to delivering better performing retail energy markets. A short-term approach to consumer empowerment focuses only on switching as a measurable outcome.
At the same time, the Commission emphasises the importance of full consumer protection and catering for vulnerable consumers and energy poverty, and whereas this falls under the remit of individual Member States, the Commission accepts that common minimum criteria may be considered (Commission 2015b, pp. 7) . It should be mentioned at this junction that the causes of consumer vulnerabilities are multiple and comprise both personal and market vulnerabilities. Elderly people, people on low income or with disabilities suffer from personal vulnerabilities and energy poverty presents an example of personal vulnerability linked to low income. Market vulnerabilities are linked to the inability to process the relevant information because of reasons pertaining to the specific market context. For example, in liberalised retail energy markets consumers may find it difficult to evaluate different offers, because of their respective complex structure.
Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the interplay between empowerment and protection and adopts a pragmatic approach. It does not challenge the liberalisation paradigm nor does it aim at formulating an alternative normative policy proposal. This is not to suggest that it is not worth pondering about the risks of this market-driven approach (Bartl 2015) . Instead, this article attempts to provide a pragmatic exposition of how the existing paradigm can work better. There is a problem with the existing approach -not because of the proposed measures conferring more information to consumers expecting active consumer behaviour -but rather because of the lack of proper debate in relation to the possible impact of such measures. The assumption is that consumers will act upon the information provided thereby triggering competition between different providers. But what happens when consumers do not take any action? Does that suggest that the market is failing? What are the reasons for such inactivity?
Over-reliance on consumer switching as the means to pursue and trigger competition in retail energy markets is misplaced, since consumer inactivity is not always an indicator of a problem requiring regulatory intervention. Yet, it may be a sign that certain categories of vulnerable consumers are excluded from reaping the benefits of liberalised retail energy markets and for those categories additional protection is needed. The way national regulatory and competition authorities strike this balance has an impact on the functioning of retail energy markets, especially given their highly politicised nature that may trigger political intervention, which then in turn adversely impacts the competitive process. Therefore, the Commission approach in relation to empowering consumers through specific measures (empowerment as a process) is a step in the right direction, but may take time to materialise and result in high switching level (empowerment as an outcome).
Embarking from the Commission's approach to empowering consumers while guaranteeing protection for the vulnerable, this article argues that empowerment should be seen as a long-term process that is worth nourishing. The Commission and national regulatory authorities should focus on measures to improve the empowerment process and not equate empowerment with the mere act of switching between different energy suppliers. Focusing on empowerment as a process calls for improving access to information and consumers' ability to assess it and does not necessarily lead to tangible results in the short term, absent switching. The fact that consumers do not switch may indicate a problem with empowerment as a process, it may suggest that consumer education takes time to materialize or equally it may represent a conscious consumer choice. Examining all these scenarios and the potential of empowerment as a process will prevent misperceived regulatory interventions and aid the phasing out of certain vulnerabilities pertaining to the market context. Measures providing more information to consumers in order to trigger active consumer behaviour, as per the Commission proposals, need time to materialise. This is linked first to the nature of empowerment, which is very difficult to measure as psychology, behavioural economics and marketing literature suggests. Second, the fact that consumers do not actively switch does not necessarily suggest that they are not empowered. Inactivity may well represent a deliberate choice after careful evaluation of all available information. Third, retail energy markets -given their politicised nature and the importance of energy for consumers -may invite short-term political intervention not allowing sufficient time to measures triggering switching to materialise.
Hence, this article employs three main reasons to support a long-term approach to the process of empowerment, which are linked to the nature of empowerment, the actors and the market context, and is structured as follows. Section II maps out the role of consumers in the context of EU energy policy debates. Section III builds on theories of empowerment in psychology, marketing studies and behavioural economics and distinguishes between measures advancing empowerment and their respective results.
Section IV focuses on the role of consumers in competitive markets post liberalisation and discusses the key characteristics of multiple consumer images. Section V examines the 'inherently flawed' nature of retail energy markets. The UK retail energy market serves as an example to highlight the complexities and provide a pragmatic exposition of the preceding theoretical analysis, which alludes to different mismatches and paradoxes.
EU Energy Policy: Delivering For Consumers?
The article's focus on the process of consumer empowerment rather than the act of switching needs to be understood against the backdrop of the EU approach to the role of consumers in liberalised energy markets. This section critically discusses the relevant legislative framework, its evolution and current marked focus on promoting empowerment while at the same time catering for the needs of vulnerable consumers through specific measures.
EU Internal Energy Market and Consumers: The Framework
The adoption of EU energy legislation is a difficult exercise in balancing various Member States' interests and the EU striving to achieve open and competitive markets. The progressive liberalisation of energy markets in the EU follows a wellknown pattern predicated on the assumption that liberalised energy markets will deliver the most and safeguard the interests of consumers (Johnston 2016, pp. 93 Improving consumer protection was one of the drivers behind the Third Energy Package at EU level, which is reflected in the enhanced measures adopted to that end (Johnston and Block 2012, pp. 162) . The Third Electricity and Gas Directives These proposals appear to enhance the process of consumer empowerment by focusing on the realisation of consumer active participation in the market as well as on improving electricity self-generation (Commission 2016f, paras. 25, 29 Despite doubling in the last six years EU switching rates remain quite low. Consumers' lack of switching can be partly explained by the existence of end-user price regulation 
Consumer Empowerment as a Process
As the previous discussion showed, central to the EU legislative framework on energy market liberalisation are tools to empower and protect consumers. The Commission defined empowered consumers as those able to "make optimal decisions by understanding their own preferences and the choices available to them. They know their is criticised for failing to cater for consumers' needs. This section argues that in instances where evidence of consumer behaviour is low, regulators should first focus on improving the different stages of the process, while acknowledging the difficulties in measuring empowerment, and as a second step complement the information paradigm with regulatory measures.
In order to sustain the need to improve the process of empowerment, rather than focusing on outcomes, the analysis in this section explores the cross-disciplinary nature of empowerment. Empowerment as a concept is explored from different perspectives in many disciplines. This article looks first into psychology and marketing literature, in a bid to show that empowerment is multifaceted and is understood mainly as the process and the way people interact with their environment. Hence, for the purposes of this article, which focuses on consumer empowerment, and argues that regulators should primarily focus on improving the process of empowerment, it is important that other disciplines provide evidence that support the focus on the process.
Second, this article draws from behavioural economics in order to allude to the limits and shortcomings of the empowerment process. Behavioural economics point to limits in rationality and the ability of consumers to evaluate their interests due to various cognitive limitations and behavioural biases. However, insights from behavioural economics, instead of challenging the idea of consumer empowerment as an aid to the competitive discipline, should be used in order to improve the empowerment process and progressively phase out these biases, at least in relation to some consumer groups, through consumer education.
According to Perkins and Zimmerman empowerment is an open-ended term and
"definitions of empowerment abound" (Perkins and Zimmerman 1995, pp. 570 ). They offered a concise account of the relevant psychology literature, highlighting the identification of capabilities and pointing to empowerment both as a process and an outcome, which permits the study of the consequences of the relevant empowerment processes (Perkins and Zimmerman 1995 ). Zimmerman's research on psychological empowerment (distinct from organizational or community empowerment) suggested that the development of a universal and global measure of empowerment is neither feasible nor desirable (Zimmerman 1995) .
Our discussion here focuses on a different construction of empowerment, namely consumer empowerment; nonetheless interesting analogies can be drawn with CC3, para 296). Yet, consumer behavioural biases are present at all different stages of the decision making process. These biases are linked to both the quality and quantity of information. For example, framing bias suggests that the way a certain situation is presented may induce consumers to act accordingly (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) . In addition, consumers may choose not to act because of loss aversion and status quo bias, according to which people are more concerned about losing rather than gaining something and are likely to retain the status quo and prefer the default option (Stucke 2007, pp. 527-528) .
Related to this is the question of what is the 'right' amount of information as too much information may induce consumers to make the wrong choices. According to quantitative studies, lower switching rates are observed when consumers are presented with more options (Wilson and Waddams Price 2005) . Therefore, the question arises as to whether the provision of more information facilitates the exercise of choice as more information may result in confusion, creating the so-called confusopoly problem (Mehta and R. Sugden 2013, pp. 41) . The existence of such biases can be exploited by energy suppliers and impact on consumers' search and switching costs, thereby preventing the realisation of consumer empowerment. The focus should be on how to address these biases while taking into account the impact of the adopted remedies on the competitive process. In addition, remedies should account for the fact that nonswitching cannot always be attributed to consumers' behavioural biases; it may be a balanced choice to remain with their supplier.
As pointed out in the ACER/CEER Market Monitoring Report "when assessing competition using switching rates, it is also important to consider the reasons for not In sum, different approaches to empowerment in psychology, marketing and behavioural economics suggest that the focus should be on the process of improving consumer skills and addressing consumers' often inherent inability to participate as actors in retail energy markets. At the same time, one should be cautious as instances of consumers' passive behaviour cannot necessarily be equated with a failure of the process of empowerment. They may simply form an instance of passive engagement.
Consumers as Market Actors: Multiple Consumer Images
The above analysis on the process of empowerment suggests that consumers may participate in markets with different levels of intensity. Consumers can be placed on a spectrum comprising empowered consumers, i.e. active engaged consumers and passive engaged consumers, as well as disengaged consumers. The emphasis is on empowered active consumers as a trigger to the competitive process (OFT 1224, pp.
18; CC3, para 295). Passive engaged and disengaged consumers have in common their inactivity, i.e. the fact that they do not switch between different suppliers. Nonetheless, passive engaged consumers have the ability to access and assess the information and their lack of action is a conscious choice and should not be equated with vulnerability.
An emerging paradigm of multiple consumer images is observed (Lavrijssen 2014 ).
Despite overlaps between the different groups, all of these images are present in energy policy debates and influence the adoption of different remedies to empower and protect consumers.
The concept of the empowered consumer finds its expression in EU consumer law in the concept of the average consumer, who is defined as "well informed and Consumers' inability to process complex information may be given as an example of vulnerability related to the specific market context. This is the area where the process of empowerment through the provision of information should primarily focus. If the provision of information together with consumer abilities and skills is improved, this type of market vulnerability will progressively subside. On the other hand, the competitive process cannot cater for personal vulnerabilities and needs to be complemented with additional regulatory and social measures. The focus on measures to tackle energy poverty reflects this approach. Such an approach draws the right balance between market related measures and measures protecting consumers directly in retail energy markets, in the light of the inherent characteristics of these markets, discussed in the following section.
Retail Energy Markets: 'Inherently Flawed Markets' and the UK Example
This section embarks on a concise exposition of the nature of retail energy markets.
The analysis examines certain characteristics of the respective markets, namely their highly politicised nature, the inevitable interplay between competition and regulation as well as the importance of energy for consumers, and exemplifies these characteristics in the context of the UK retail energy markets. By using concrete examples of failed regulatory interventions in the UK context, the analysis ultimately reveals that a shortterm focus on consumer switching -as the outcome of the empowerment processadversely impacts consumer welfare. Rather, the focus should be on the long-term process of empowerment and avoid short-term political interventions.
In the UK, the short term focus on switching as the measurable outcome of the empowerment process resulted in wrong regulatory interventions. Here, we employ two examples of remedies proposed by Ofgem to exemplify this point; first, the nondiscrimination obligation imposed on electricity suppliers (preventing them from charging different prices in different regions) and second, the imposition of an obligation to simplify and limit the number of available offers.
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) undertook the last review of the UK retail energy market. The CMA equally focused on triggering switching through improving consumer information as well as protecting vulnerable consumers through the imposition of a transitional price cap. The CMA accepts that measures to promote consumer engagement require time to deliver results. Yet, in the interim, the CMA retreated to more traditional interventionist measures.
The Nature of Retail Energy Markets
The nature of retail energy markets may further exacerbate consumers' personal and market vulnerabilities, the former because of the essentiality of energy and the latter due to various complexities in evaluating different offers. Acknowledging these limitations aids in a refocusing of empowerment on the process rather than the outcome of switching and in the concomitant construction of adequate remedies to tackle personal vulnerabilities, primarily energy poverty.
Retail energy markets present inelastic demand, regulatory intervention and a politicised nature in the light of their importance for consumers. Energy is essential to our everyday lives. It is a homogenous product, which, in light of its importance, must be priced at affordable levels (Bartl 2010; Deller and Waddams 2015; Pront van Bommel 2016) . Energy markets may present high levels of concentration, vertically integrated firms and problems with access to distribution infrastructure, which can affect the levels of competition. In the light of these characteristics, energy markets can be seen as 'inherently flawed' markets. Another way to view energy markets is as markets with "wicked problems".
Kolk (2012, pp.180) has described "wicked problems" as "difficult to solve, not for technical reasons […] but because of social complexities, including interdependencies, multi-causalities, divergent perceptions, involving a multitude of stakeholders, and an evolution in several of these aspects over time as well, with sometimes unforeseen consequences of measures taken". These problems can be linked to the various images of consumers and the fact that the market may cater for certain groups, i.e. engaged consumers but not others, i.e. the disengaged.
The competitive process does not cater for every consumer, nor does it necessarily guarantee ethically acceptable results (Hammond 1993, pp. 21 Such regulatory intervention may adversely impact the competitive process, as indicated by Ofgem's intervention following its two reviews of the UK retail energy markets.
In effect, in retail energy markets, the most appropriate reaction to an identified market malfunctioning is hard to identify and place within the competition law or regulatory realm. The application of competition law with a regulatory mindset can be accepted to the extent that competition and regulation share some of the same aims such as maximising efficiency and improving consumer choice. However, they employ different tools to attain these and, as Justice Breyer, eloquently stated "antitrust analysis must sensitively recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the regulated industry to which it applies"(Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co).
In simple terms, competition enhances the available offers, in terms of price, quality and choice, thereby allowing consumers to choose between different products that suit their needs. Such demand side responses in turn create a virtuous circle, as the exercise of that choice prompts suppliers to improve in order to gain consumer trust.
Hence, the competitive process progressively educates consumers to react to market signals and assess the relevant offers based on the given information and as such, competition law has the potential to ameliorate vulnerabilities pertaining to the market context.
The relationship between competition law and regulation creates difficulties in situations where they pursue conflicting aims. The conflict may be internal in cases where both competition and regulation pursue the economic goal of efficiency maximisation with regulation adopting a short-term approach, or external given that regulation may pursue a wider range of goals ranging from economic to a diverse array of non-economic goals (Prosser 2010, pp. 18) . The different mandates of energy regulators and competition authorities reflect this diversity in goals. For example, the CMA is entrusted with the promotion of competition for the benefit of consumers, whereas Ofgem's principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and future energy consumers, pursuing a range of public interest objectives such as the reduction of greenhouse emissions and security of energy supply and having regard to the interests of vulnerable customers, such as those who are chronically sick, of pensionable age and on low incomes (OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, paras 2.4, 3.32) .
Finding a proper balance between accommodating economic and non-economic goals in retail energy markets is essential given the unavoidable symbiotic relationship between competition and regulation and the fact that the existence of different public interest goals, such as the protection of certain vulnerable consumers, may have negative spillover effects on competition. This balance is linked to the question of the attribution of different responsibilities and roles between competition and energy regulators. As the UK example showcases, the energy regulator, Ofgem, should be more cognizant of the impact of regulatory remedies on the competitive process. At the same time, the competition regulator, the CMA, should not step into the market to covertly protect certain vulnerable groups.
UK Retail Energy Markets: Mapping the issues
The British residential gas market was fully liberalised in May 1998 with the electricity the discrimination between different payment methods (with the exception of introductory offers), the latter following EU legislation.
In relation to regional price discrimination, before energy liberalization there was one electricity and gas supplier per region. After liberalization, new entrants (who were the main suppliers in other regions) offered lower prices in new regions in order to attract customers from the incumbents. It was observed that new entrants offered lower prices, while the incumbents charged 10 per cent. more to their existing customers, thereby exploiting the loyalty of the consumers in their home markets, who were overall reluctant to switch to a new entrant despite the better prices offered (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 237) . One of Ofgem's prime considerations was the fact that vulnerable consumers were less prone to switching and were not benefiting from better offers. Ofgem introduced a prohibition on price discrimination since active consumers switching between suppliers could not bring prices down for the inactive group, which comprised predominantly vulnerable consumers. Therefore, the regulator driven from fairness consideration and the idea that the active consumer group cannot benefit at the expense of the inactive group (which included primarily vulnerable consumers) stepped in to protect the vulnerable consumer group (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 237 ).
The introduction of non-discrimination obligations regarding payment methods also sought to favour vulnerable consumers (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 244 ). There are three payment methods: standard credit by quarterly cheque, direct debit monthly through standing order from the bank account and prepayment (pay-as-you-go).
Prepayment meters are installed when customers have a poor payment record (CMA 2015, paras 92-94). For energy suppliers, direct debit customers are preferable to the other two groups. Research suggests that it could be beneficial for lowering prices, if there is competition for direct debit customers (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 248) .
Competition for direct debit customers would result in lower prices and as suppliers could not discriminate between direct debit, standard credit and prepayment customers, the latter groups would also benefit from lower prices. Unfortunately though, competition was undermined by the introduction of non-discrimination obligation between different regions, since this resulted in chilling competition and a rise in prices.
This rise in prices affected the more vulnerable groups, since, as Ofgem pointed out, vulnerable consumers are less likely to switch, while active empowered consumers could still benefit from different offers. The introduction of regional non-discrimination clauses reduced the potential gains from switching and thereby had a dampening effect on the switching levels, as consumers' decisions are driven by the potential benefits (Waddams Price 2013, pp. 77).
A second example of regulatory intervention that was not well thought out comes from Ofgem's second review of the retail electricity markets. In the RMR, Arguably, Ofgem's previous involvement and the two reviews of retail energy markets, have influenced the following CMA market investigation (Littlechild 2015, pp. 591-592) . Ofgem failed to assess the impact of the proposed remedies on competition placing the onus on the CMA to address various problems, some of which possibly outside its mandate to promote competition for the benefits of consumers. The CMA identified weak customer engagement as one of the AECs in its investigation (CMA. (2016b) , para 125). As such the CMA proposed remedies to promote consumer empowerment and active engagement. These remedies have been criticised as intervening in the market to prompt or "nudge" (Baldwin 2014, Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008) consumers and trigger engagement may result in an interventionist approach (Littlechild 2014, pp.198) . Nonetheless, it remains within the CMA's remit to improve demand side responses in the context of a market investigation.
However, it is less clear whether the CMA can propose remedies for the protection of vulnerable consumers -without distinguishing between market and personal vulnerabilities. For this reason, the CMA phrased the remedies that favour primarily vulnerable groups in terms of promoting the engagement of more disengaged groups (CMA 2016c, paras 9.14-9.15, 9.60). The proposed remedies though suggest that the CMA has taken into account the interests of vulnerable consumers directly (CMA 2016c, paras 12.448, 14.463, 16.12) . The CMA's decision addressed both personal reasons as well as market related reasons for consumers' inactivity. In relation to personal attributes the CMA observed that disengaged customers present characteristics, such as low incomes, low qualifications, living in rented accommodation or aged over 65 years (CMA 2016b, para 135) .
Following its market investigation, the CMA proposed remedies aimed at triggering switching and directly protecting vulnerable consumers. Apart from removing large elements of the "simpler choices" component, the CMA proposed an
Ofgem led programme providing for a more evidence based intervention based on testing and trialing (CMA 2016b, paras 229-230; CMA 2016c para. 20.24) . In addition, the CMA focused on "principles rather than rules" and recommended that Ofgem changes Standard License Condition 25C requiring that suppliers have due regard in the design of tariffs to customers' ability to compare (CMA 2016a, para 98; CMA 2016c, para 20.26) .
The remedies focused also on strengthening third party intermediaries' role by removing regulatory restrictions and granting access to customers' data (CMA 2016a, paras 100-105; CMA 2016c, para 20.24) . These remedies included an Ofgem controlled database of disengaged customers (the Database Remedy), which would allow rival suppliers to send a letter to consumers that have remained on a Standard Variable Tariff (SVT), for more than three years -prompting them to switch. SVT is the tariff charged, where consumers do not choose a specific plan or when a fixed term non SVT expires.
Consumers can opt out of such prompts and suppliers having access to this database would be subject to strict scrutiny. The CMA recognised that there is a fine balance between triggering customer switching and aggressive marketing practices (CMA 2016a, paras 106-110; CMA 2016c, para 20.24) . The CMA further placed a lot of hope in smart meters' contribution to customer engagement and therefore has put pressure on suppliers to ensure the roll-out of smart meters by 2020 (failing which Ofgem would be expected to impose penalties) (CMA 2016a, paras 114-115; CMA 2016c, paras 208-210) .
One of the most controversial and widely discussed remedies is the imposition of a transitional price cap for customers on prepayment meters for a transitional period (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) . The CMA found that often-vulnerable consumers are on prepayment meters and therefore the introduction of this remedy aimed at directly protecting them.
The CMA was cautious not to excessively intervene in the market and therefore the initial proposal to apply the price a cap to all SVT customers was dropped (CMA 2016a, paras 143-145; CMA 2016c, paras 243-244 and para. 20.24) . Interestingly though, the competition regulator proposed a price cap aiming at directly protecting the vulnerable consumers, exposing the regulatory undertone of the proposed remedies. Ofgem announced that in 2016 switching saw a six year high coupled with an increasing number of new suppliers (Barnes 2017) . On these switching rates, Ofgem's CEO Dermot Nolan commented that while these latest figures indicate good progress, the market is not as competitive as the regulator would have liked. This situation justified the introduction of the temporary price cap (Ofgem 2017) . However, it is inherent in the nature of competitive markets that some consumers will not reap the benefits. High switching rates and the increase in new entrants suggest that the market is competitive. For certain consumer groups that do not engage with the competitive process and hence are unduly disadvantaged additional protection is needed, but this should come as a complement to the competitive process, rather than suggesting that the market is not competitive.
Overall, the experience in the UK retail energy markets suggests that in 'inherently flawed' markets, regulators should be cautious regarding the appropriate mix of competition and regulatory remedies. Triggering consumer empowerment in retail energy markets is complicated by the nature of the market, which calls for a more process based approach and a clearer delineation between different consumer groups.
The process based enforcement strategies rest on information disclosure and better consumer education. Crampes and Waddams have suggested that different information campaigns may be needed for different consumer groups. For example, a tailored campaign stressing the actual gains from switching has the potential to incentivize older consumers that, as evidence suggests, seem to underestimate the potential gains from switching (2017, pp. 20-21) . Better information campaign stressing the gains from switching can address consumers' perception about low gains from switching and incentivize more consumers to actively engage, as research shows that the anticipated gains are a main factor driving switching behaviour (Deller et al 2014, pp.4 ). Yet, non switching may indicate a satisfaction with the current supplier (Zhu 2013, pp. 68) .
Process based enforcement strategies call for more reliance on market forces. At the same time, they accept the limits of the market mechanisms in situations, where consumers are unable to engage with the market due to personal vulnerabilities pertaining to personal attributes such as age, disabilities and low income. In these cases, tailored measures to protect these consumer groups are needed in the short term, as reliance to switching to deliver lower prices is a long term process.
The CMA's suggested remedies were guided by a quest to protect consumer groups with certain characteristics, which place them in a vulnerable position, in a bid to motivate them to engage in the market. This is a worthy goal, yet it is unclear how the introduction of a price cap can assist in this direction. In addition, remedies to prompt switching -such as the Database Remedy -may fail to engage consumers, given consumers' attitudes towards receiving 'prompts'. Remedies to promote engagement need time to unravel their potential and they may fail due to the many variants driving consumer behaviour. In the meantime, the CMA has opted for a retreat to traditional intervention, introducing a price cap in order to directly protect prepayment meter customers, while acknowledging the tensions that such a remedy may create with the levels of competition and engagement and stressing that the design of this remedy will allow competition to co-exist (CMA 2016b, para 207) .
In sum, the suggested approach is reliance on the process of empowerment coupled with targeted social policy measures. Competitive markets cannot cater for certain personal vulnerabilities. Regulatory measures can improve the functioning of markets for certain consumer groups. This is not to suggest that consumers with personal vulnerabilities, such as the fuel poor, do not have the ability to engage with the market. For reasons of justice and fairness, they need to be supported in the interim with additional measures because they lack the ability to afford their energy bills. This approach corresponds to the "regulatory welfare state" (Haber 2011; Levi Faur 2014) .
At the same time, regulators need to be particularly cautious about the impact of the suggested remedies to empower and protect consumers on the competitive process, since as the UK experience suggests, remedies with the intention to deliver fairer market outcomes led to worse outcomes for all consumer groups and did not solve the "poor pay more" problem (Caplovitz 1967) . Instead, they made it worse.
Conclusion
How effective has our quest for consumer empowerment been? Could it be that a narrow definition of its goals and subsequently narrow measurement provide us with distorted outcomes? This article has advanced the claim that in retail energy markets, regulators should focus on empowerment as a process rather than focusing on the outcome of switching. After all, if empowerment is seen as the outcome of switching it does not accommodate the multiple consumer images, as it does not account for the category of passive, yet empowered consumers. As noted, empowerment as a process has inherent limits, as examined by the psychology, marketing and behavioural economics literature, since the process is linked to specific outcomes that cannot always be measured. Equally, when the process does not lead to the desirable outcome, in our case switching suppliers, one should ponder why the desired outcome has not materialized and may be attributed to various consumer biases. These limits can be overcome through consumer education, which is a time intensive process. In addition to the above, the nature of retail energy markets as inherently flawed calls for a symbiotic relationship between competition and regulation. Allowing time for the process of empowerment has the potential to progressively phase out vulnerabilities linked to the market context. The UK example suggests that this approach is prophylactic to short-term political interventions in retail energy markets.
On the contrary, if the focus is on triggering switching in the short-term, with an underlying rationale of protecting vulnerable groups (without clearly distinguishing between market and personal vulnerabilities), this will have an adverse impact on the competitive process and adversely affect the very consumers that it sought to protect, as shown by the example of the UK retail energy markets. Following two market reviews by Ofgem, in which it failed to properly assess the competition implications of its proposed remedies, the CMA became involved and had to act in favour of vulnerable groups who potentially fall outside its remit. This article focused on specific Ofgem interventions that impaired the outcome for vulnerable consumers and critically assessed selected remedies proposed by the CMA in a bid to show that they will most likely fail to invigorate competition to the benefit of consumers. CMA remedies focus on empowerment as the measurable act of switching and depict a mismatch between the competition mandate of the CMA and the regulatory nature of the said remedies.
The Commission's and UK regulators' approach is correct in advocating better information proliferation to consumers through, for example, the roll-out of smart meters. Ultimately though this is a time consuming and on-going process and any measures adopted in the interim to protect vulnerable consumers should take account of the potential adverse effects on competition. They should also reflect on the underlying reasons triggering vulnerability. For example, as consumers progressively become more familiar with the respective conditions in liberalised retail energy markets, they will be more capable of assessing various offers. Information disclosure and consumer education coupled with competition gradually address market vulnerabilities. The emphasis should be placed on vulnerabilities caused by personal attributes, such as low income and for such vulnerabilities, a regulatory approach through the social welfare system or direct financial assistance is warranted. Such an approach is alien to the mandate of competition authorities and should be administered by sectoral regulators or the legislature, in consultation with the competition authority's opinion on any adverse impact of the suggested measures on competition.
